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WELFARE STATE REGIMES AND THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HEALTH
Clare Bambra
Durham University, U.K. 
ABSTRACT
International research on the social determinants of health has increasingly
integrated a welfare state perspective, comparing and explaining the differing
health outcomes of developed countries through reference to the concept of
welfare state regimes. Although this is to be welcomed, to date the empirical
research has been conducted without reference to much in the way of welfare
state theories.  In this paper, I situate welfare state regimes and health within the
context of political economy theories of the development of the welfare state.
Theoretical explanations of the initial emergence of post-war welfare state
capitalism are described and the international variants (welfare state regimes)
are outlined and compared. The crisis and reform of developed welfare states is
examined and contextualised within the wider economic structural shifts from
Fordism to post-Fordism. The emergence of new forms of welfare state regimes
(post-Fordist workfare state regimes) is also described. Finally, these theories
are related to what is already known from the empirical social epidemiology
literature about differences in population health by welfare state regime. 
PERSONAL REFLEXIVE STATEMENT
I have a strong personal commitment to improving public health via non-health
care interventions and to reducing social inequalities in health. As a young
researcher I was drawn to public health because it is the ultimate measure of
inequality, poverty and the unfairness of our economic and political system: in
all countries, people from a lower social class tend to die younger and
experience more ill health, and life expectancy usually shortens with each step
down the social ladder. Beyond researching the social determinants of health, I
am an active trade unionist and a member of two radical UK health campaign
groups the Politics of Health Group (www.pohg.org.uk) and the Socialist Health
Association (www.sochealth.co.uk).  I have also contributed to public debates
about poverty and health via media interviews and contributing articles to non-
academic magazines (such as the Health Service Journal www.hsj.co.uk). 
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he “welfare state” is a contested term within social and political analysis
(Eikemo and Bambra 2008). Conventionally, the phrase has been used in
a narrow sense, as a means of referring to the various post-war “state measures
for the provision of key welfare services” (Pierson 1994:7) or those state policies
that permit, encourage or discourage the decommodification of labour. The
“welfare state” is thus understood as “a shorthand for the state’s role in
education, health, housing, poor relief, social insurance and other social
services” (Ginsburg 1979: 3) in developed capitalist countries during the post-
war period. The welfare state “involves state responsibility for securing some
basic modicum of welfare for its citizens” (Esping-Anderson 1990: 18-19). In
this sense, state responsibility and action “embraces not only the direct provision
of benefits and services, but also the regulation and subsidy (including fiscal
reliefs) of the various private forms of welfare” (Ginsburg 1992:1). The term—
welfare state—is thus “used infrequently as a shorthand for the post-war social
system of the West comprising a mixed economy, a liberal polity and a social
welfare sector” (Mishra 1984: xi). 
However, more broadly, the welfare state is considered to be “a particular
form of state, a distinctive form of polity or a specific type of society” (Pierson
1998: 7). In political-economy terms then, the welfare state is understood as a
particular form of state: “this term (welfare state) is used interchangeably with
‘welfare capitalism’ and refers to a particular capitalist state regime considered
to have emerged in advanced western capitalist societies in the post-war period”
(Hay 1996: 9). Thus, the welfare state is regarded “as a form of capitalism”
(George and Page 1995: 199), the fundamental concern of which is “the
maintenance and reproduction of (gendered) capitalist social relations”
(Ginsburg 1979: 2) and the “use of state power to modify the reproduction of
labour power and to maintain the non-working population in capitalist societies”
(Gough 1979: 44-5). 
WELFARE STATE CAPITALISM
The political economy perspective explains the emergence of the post-war
(Fordist) welfare state and the ongoing development and reform of the welfare
state (post-Fordist) as a result of the requirements of capital for accumulation,
legitimation and reproduction (e.g. O'Connor 1973; Offe 1984). The
“requirements of capital” thesis contains one basic premise, that “the welfare
state is a response to problems or needs generated by capitalism” (Piven and
Cloward 1971/1993: 413), that the emergence of the welfare state is directly
“attributable to the growth of monopoly (Fordist) capitalism” (O’Connor
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1973:159) and the subsequent need “to expand demand and domestic markets”
(O’Connor 1973: 150-1). The state is thus regarded as the “ideal collective
capitalist,” it intervenes in the economy in order to enable the continued
reproduction of the capitalist system. Capitalism is unable to “self-reproduce”
because of the competition of individual capitals. Its continuation is therefore
dependent on interventions made in the collective interest of all capitals. The
only institution/body relatively autonomous from any one capital is the state—
the “ideal collective capitalist.” In short, the state (as the “ideal collective
capitalist”) acquires a more active economic and political role in order to enable
the continued reproduction of the capitalist system.
Accumulation
In The Fiscal Crisis of the State, O’Connor (1973) argues that advanced
monopoly (Fordist) capitalism produces the paradox of “surplus goods” (created
by overproduction) and an impoverished “surplus population” (a result of the
unemployment caused by technological change), the welfare state is the means
by which the paradox is resolved: “Surplus goods are taken off the market by the
surplus population with purchasing power provided by the welfare system”
(O’Connor 1973: 151). Furthermore, the problem of the surplus population is
partially resolved by the employment created by “the welfare agencies
established to control the remainder of the surplus population” (O’Connor 1973:
151). Therefore, the welfare state is a means of absorbing surplus goods and
stimulating demand within the domestic market, thus enhancing capital
accumulation and reproduction.
Legitimation
O’Connor asserts that the welfare state also fulfils a legitimating function: The
welfare state “must try to fulfil two basic and often mutually contradictory
functions—accumulation and legitimisation” (O’Connor 1973: 6). The state
must maintain both the conditions for profitable capital accumulation and it must
also provide “social harmony.” However, the state cannot use coercion to ensure
accumulation, as this would decrease its popular legitimacy. The state therefore
utilises a more ideological approach through which its strategies are either
“mystified” or “concealed.” The welfare state is an example of this process as it
is “required to maintain social harmony—to fulfill the state’s legitimation
function” (O’Connor 1973: 7). Offe (1984) takes a similar approach and claims
that the welfare state is designed to “harmonise the privately regulated capitalist
economy with the (contradictory) processes of socialisation this economy
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triggers” (p. 51). He argues that the state intervenes indirectly in the economy,
through the welfare state and demand management, to prevent economic crisis
through recommodification and to prevent a legitimation crisis through, for
example, the incorporation of labour in neo-corporatist economic management.
The welfare state is concerned to meet capitalism’s need “to secure, on the one
hand, continued accumulation, and on the other, continued legitimation” (Offe
1984: 58). 
Reproduction
It is also argued that the welfare state is a means of subsidising the cost to capital
of the production and reproduction of labour power and, as labour is “an element
of capital” (Gough 1979: 55), the cost of the production and reproduction of the
capitalist system itself. The production/reproduction of labour is a complex task
requiring food, shelter, health and increasingly in modern capitalism, education.
The cost of labour production and reproduction is high as it “involves not only
daily reproduction but generational reproduction” (Gough 1979: 46). Prior to the
emergence of the welfare state, these costs were borne entirely by the capitalist
class in the level of wages paid out. However, the emergence of the welfare state
replaced the burden upon the taxation system, thus enabling employers
(capitalists) to pay out lower wages and increase their profits: “the welfare
state...lowered the production and reproduction costs of human labour-power and
has thereby raised the rate of profit” (Dearlove and Saunders 1991: 397). For
example, the advent of subsidised housing decreased the amount of rent paid by
the inhabitant worker and therefore, the total income that he/she required on a
weekly basis for his/her production and reproduction. This has meant that
“employers have been able to pay lower wages than would otherwise have to be
paid” (Dearlove and Saunders 1991: 398).  Indeed, the social provision provided
by the welfare state is funded predominantly through the taxation of the working
class; “welfare programs of one kind or another are financed by appropriating tax
funds from the better-paid monopoly and state sector workers” (O’Connor 1973:
161). The welfare state enables the capitalist class (especially monopoly capital)
to avoid the total cost of the reproduction of labour by redistributing resources
within the working class. This serves to “expand productivity, and accelerate
accumulation and profits” (O’Connor 1973: 162). The welfare state functions for
the benefit, not of the poor but of the capitalist class.
HUMANITY & SOCIETY102
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The initial emergence of the welfare state and its ongoing development is thus
determined by a combination of the changing internal needs of capital
accumulation and the external pressures which contextualise and shape these
needs, such as structural changes in the globalised/international economy. For
example, Jessop (1991; 1994a; 1994b) and Torfing (1999a; 1999b) argue that the
changes in European welfare states that have occurred since the 1980s are a
result of the shift from the Fordist system of welfare state capitalism, which
could afford and required a high level of public welfare expenditure, to a post-
Fordist system of capitalist accumulation with which high welfare expenditure is
incompatible with the continuing needs of capital accumulation (Table 1).  
The welfare state was a crucial element of the post-war Fordist regulation
system (1950s-1980s), in terms of reconciling the interests of capital and labour,
and because it was in this period that the welfare state expanded and consumed
an ever increasing slice of the national economy (GDP). The Fordist welfare
state and Fordist economic process were directly inter-related as “the welfare
state helped to secure the conditions for Fordist economic expansion and the
latter helped in turn to secure the conditions for the conditions for the expansion
of the welfare state” (Jessop 1994b: 255). 
The Fordist welfare state aided Fordist capitalist accumulation both
economically and through its regulatory role. Economically, the post-war welfare
state provided full employment in relatively closed national economies and did
so through the use of Keynesian demand-side economic management. At the
regulatory level, the welfare state aided accumulation by restricting collective
bargaining over wage levels to within the rate of growth provided by the full
employment economy; and it generalized mass consumption beyond those
employed within the Fordist sectors of the economy to all workers. The provision
of a social wage, via a redistributive welfare system, spread the benefits of
productivity to even the economically inactive: “To secure the conditions for
social reproduction, the welfare national state was orientated to welfare in so far
as it tried to generalise norms of mass consumption beyond those employed in
the Fordist sectors so that all national citizens might share the fruits of economic
growth” (Torfing 1999b: 373). This process not only helped to stimulate
domestic demand for Fordist mass produced consumer goods, but it also
provided conditions in which it was possible for the state to reconcile the
interests of organized capital and organized labour. “It was the dominance of the
Fordist mode of growth that enabled the state to link the interests of organised
capital and labour in a programme of full employment and social welfare”
(Jessop 1994: 255). Thus “the welfare state under Fordism was shaped by both
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Table 1: Key features of Fordist and Post-Fordist Capitalism
(Sources: Jessop 1991; 1994a; 1994b; Nielsen 1991; Pierson 1994)
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the accumulation needs of capital (including mass consumption as an important
component in the valorisation of capital) and the defensive strength of the
organised working class” (Pierson 1994: 97).
THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE STATE CAPITALISM
There are national variations on the general Fordist welfare state (Jessop 1991;
1994a; 1994b; Torfing 1999a; 1999b). In The Three Worlds of Welfare State
Capitalism, Esping-Andersen (1990) argues there are three broad types of
(Fordist) welfare state: Liberal, Conservative and Social Democratic (Table 2).
Table 2: The Three Worlds of Welfare and Workfare Capitalism 
(Sources: Esping-Andersen 1990; Jessop 1991, 1994a; 1994b; Bambra 2006)
Fordist
welfare
regimes
Health: 
IMR (1980) 
Post-Fordist
workfare
regimes   
Key
Countries
Health:
IMR  (1998) 
Liberal 
State provision of
welfare is minimal,
benefits are modest
and often attract strict
entitlement criteria,
and recipients are
usually means-tested
and stigmatized
12.3
neo-Liberal
“emphasises the
recommodification of
labour power, the
privatisation of state
enterprise and welfare
services and the
deregulation of the
private sector”
(Jessop 1991, p. 95). 
UK
USA
Canada
Australia
6.7 
Conservative 
Status differentiating welfare
programs in which benefits
are often earnings related,
administered through the
employer, and geared
towards maintaining existing
social patterns. The role of
the family is also emphasized
and the redistributive impact
is minimal.
10.5
neo-Corporatist
Reliance on corporatist
structures to introduce the
flexibility required, welfare
services, become
increasingly self-regulated
and welfare provision
becomes more pluralistic and
privatised.
Germany
France
Switzerland
4.5
Social Democratic
Welfare provision is
characterized by universal
and comparatively generous
benefits, a commitment to
full employment and income
protection, and a strongly
interventionist state used to
promote equality through a
redistributive social security
system.
7.6
neo-Statist
“relies on a state guided
approach to societal
reorganisation” (Torfing
1999a:8). Flexibility is
provided through an active
labour market policy. Welfare
provision becomes more
mixed but the new providers
are from the charitable and
voluntary sectors rather than
private capital. 
Denmark
Norway
Sweden
4.0
In the welfare states of the Liberal regime (UK, USA, Ireland, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand), state provision of welfare is minimal, benefits often
attract strict entitlement criteria and recipients are usually means-tested.
“Entitlement rules are strict and often associated with stigma; benefits are
typically modest” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 26). In this model, the dominance of
the market is encouraged “passively—by guaranteeing only a minimum—or
actively—by subsidising private welfare schemes” (Esping-Andersen 1990:27).
In areas such as health and pensions a stark division exists between those, largely
the poor, who rely on state aid and those who are able to afford private provision.
The welfare model “typical of Great Britain and most of the Anglo-Saxon
world…preserved the essentially modest universalism in the state, and allow the
market to reign for the growing social strata demanding superior welfare”
(Esping-Andersen 1990: 26). The Liberal welfare state regime minimises the
decommodification effects of state welfare. Furthermore, it “contains the realm
of social rights, and erects an order of stratification that is a blend of a relative
equality of poverty amongst state welfare recipients, market differentiated
welfare among the majorities, and a class-political dualism between the two”
(Esping-Andersen 1990:27).
In contrast, the Conservative welfare regime (Finland, Germany, France,
Japan, Switzerland, Italy) is concerned with the preservation of status divisions.
In the Conservative model of welfare “what predominated was the preservation
of status differentials; rights, therefore, were attached to class and status”
(Esping-Andersen 1990: 27). The Conservative welfare state regime is therefore
distinguished by its “status differentiating” welfare programs in which benefits
are often earnings related and geared towards maintaining existing social
patterns. In this welfare state, the role of the family is emphasised (often in
response to the influence of the church) and “the state will only interfere when
the family’s capacity to service its members is exhausted” (Esping-Andersen
1990: 27).  For example, childcare provision is minimal and non-working wives
are often excluded from social insurance programs. The redistributive impact of
this type of welfare state is minimal but the role of the market is marginalised.
Therefore Esping-Andersen (1990) places it between the low decommodifying
Liberal regime and the highly decommodifying Social Democratic regime.
The “third world of welfare,” the Social Democratic (Austria, Belgium,
Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden), is “composed of those countries in
which the principles of universalism and decommodification of social rights
were extended also to the new middle class” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 27). Its
provision is characterised by universal and comparatively generous benefits, a
commitment to full employment and income protection, and a strongly
interventionist state. The state is used to promote social equality through a
redistributive social security system. Unlike the other welfare state regimes, the
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Social Democratic regime type “promotes an equality of the highest standards,
not an equality of minimal needs’ (Esping-Andersen 1990: 27). Esping-Andersen
concludes that the Social Democratic welfare regime type provides “a mix of
highly decommodifying and universalistic programs” (1990: 28).   
CRISIS OF WELFARE STATE CAPITALISM
The post-Fordist school asserts that “the social and economic turbulence of the
late 1960s and early 1970s was an expression of the exhaustion of the Fordist
regime as a framework for sustainable capitalist economic growth” (Pierson
1998: 26). The crisis of the 1970s was more than the usual cyclical slump, it was
a fundamental, structural crisis of the global Fordist system affecting the
economic, social and political levels (Offe 1984; O’Connor 1973). The crisis was
characterised by economic contraction; severe decreases in the rate of economic
growth, profit levels fell, the emergence of “stagflation”—high unemployment
and high inflation; and wages grew faster than productivity (Hay 1996). Fordist
production techniques had saturated the market with mass-produced,
standardised goods (overproduction) and labour had priced itself too high
(through wage levels and the social wage).
This structural crisis, brought on by the oil crisis of 1973, revealed and
heightened the problems and weaknesses of the Fordist system of accumulation. 
The crisis of Fordism was itself a product of the cumulative
rigidities built into the post-war Fordist settlement…the very
same Fordist arrangements which had secured stability in the
period after 1945 had now grown “sclerotic” and became a
fetter upon continued economic growth (Pierson 1994: 97). 
The internal and external supports upon which Fordist economic growth relied
had begun to disintegrate (Rhodes 1997). Internally, Fordism relied upon class
compromise, corporatism, full employment and the social wage. In external
terms, there was reliance upon “a stable international monetary and trading
regime (which) depended upon the support of a hegemonic power—the United
States” (Rhodes 1997: 67). The relative decline of that power and the end of the
international regime based on the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates
contributed to the collapse of the Fordist regime of accumulation. 
The crisis also became political as the Fordist state, the welfare state, was
“deeply implicated in this self-precipitating crisis” (Pierson 1994:98):
(1) Economically - the welfare state aggravated the crisis
through its continued expansion. A fiscal crisis emerged as
social expenditure continued to rise, in part due to a rise in
unemployment and increased industrial subsidies, despite the
economic slow down and the shrinking revenue base
(O’Connor 1973). For example, social expenditure rose from
an OECD average of 12.3 percent of GDP in 1960 to 21.9
percent in 1975.
(2) Institutionally - the institutions of corporatist mediation
became an obstacle to economic reorganisation: 
The institutions of the Fordist welfare state (Big labour,
Big capital and Big state), which had once secured the
growth for capital accumulation by sustaining effective
demand and managing the relations between capital and
labour, had under new circumstances become a barrier to
further economic growth (Pierson 1994:99). 
Critics of corporatism claimed that the power balance between organised
capital and organised labour had shifted too strongly in favour of labour.
(3) Legitimacy - the failure of the welfare state to resolve the
economic crisis led to a loss in confidence in it and its
regulatory mechanisms. Capital “fell out” with the Fordist
state because it was held to be responsible for, or at least
unable to solve, the high wage levels, which grew faster than
productivity, the fall in profits, the emergence of stagflation
and the ongoing expansion of the social wage.  On labour’s
part, the Fordist welfare state was criticised for its role in
restricting collective bargaining, limiting wages, raising taxes;
and cutting spending (Jessop 1991:87-8). The class
compromise that had sustained the post-war Fordist settlement
broke down during the crisis and the welfare state was
delegitimised.
This crisis of the Keynesian welfare state stemmed from its inability to contain
the crisis of Fordism and, through the initial use of Fordist controls, the state
intensified the crisis. The typical response “involved intensifying the features of
the Fordist state, reinforcing them and complementing them” (Jessop 1994:23).
For example, early responses to the economic crisis in countries such as Sweden,
involved the continued promotion of the Fordist policy of full employment
despite the onset of fiscal crisis. Similarly, in countries such as the UK, the
response to the crisis followed classical Fordist lines as policies emphasised
austerity and social retrenchment to “squeeze out” inflation and reduce public
expenditure (Jessop 1994:23). This period in which Fordist economic tools were
still used to contain the crisis, has been described by post-Fordist theorists as a
“conjunctural transformation.” This process failed and the crisis spread from the
economic to the political, it grew from being a crisis in the welfare state, to being
a crisis of the welfare state (Jessop 1994a: 23-4). It became clearer that a new
state form was needed to resolve the crisis and a “structural transformation” and
HUMANITY & SOCIETY108
CLARE BAMBRA 109
“strategic re-orientation of the capitalist state” gradually ensued (Jessop
1994:23). 
WORKFARE CAPITALISM
The crisis of Fordism and its corresponding state form prompted a process of
social and political restructuring in the quest to establish a new basis for capitalist
accumulation (Pierson 1994:100). In global terms, this restructuring has taken
the form of the deregulation of international markets, the abandonment of fixed
exchange rates and the development of new financial institutions designed to
increase capital mobility. In industry, a number of structural changes have
occurred such as the displacement of mass production and assembly line
techniques by “batch production of diversified products…niche marketing, and
the use of new technologies” (Pierson 1994: 99). The workforce has become de-
massified and there has been a growth in different employment patterns such as
non-unionised work, sub-contracting and part-time employment (Jessop 1991;
1994a; 1994b). The state has also experienced restructuring and its interventions
are increasingly concerned with increasing the international competitiveness of
domestic export orientated industries (see Table 1).
POST-FORDISM
Jessop (1994) argues “post-Fordism can be defined as a flexible production
process based on flexible machines or systems and an appropriately flexible
workforce”( p.19). In practice this has meant the development of a new labour
process that has witnessed the de-massification of the workforce, a significantly
decreased role for the trade union movement and a shift in the balance of class
power towards capital. New occupational structures have emerged 
whereas Fordism was characterised by the key role of the
affluent mass worker (or semi-skilled worker), post-Fordism is
likely to see a growing polarisation of the workforce into a
full-time skilled core and an unskilled periphery often engaged
only part-time and subject to new forces of Taylorisation
(Jessop 1991:88). 
In accumulation terms, post-Fordism can be identified through its flexibility
and permanent innovation. “Post-Fordism provides a stable mode of economic
growth based on the dominance of a flexible and permanently innovative pattern
of accumulation” (Jessop 1994b: 19). Post-Fordist economic growth is based
upon increased productivity from economies of scope/innovation, increased
demand for differentiated goods and services, access to international markets,
and rising incomes for skilled labour and the service class (Jessop 1994b: 19).
However, unlike the Fordist regime, post-Fordism does not need to generalise the
income rises of core workers to other sections of labour to stimulate demand.
This limits the spread of prosperity and enhances the differentials between secure
full-time employees and “the periphery of poorly paid, casualised and unskilled
workers who may move in and out of a category of still more marginalised
welfare dependants” (Pierson 1994: 100).  Post-Fordist regulation is provided by
a re-structured welfare state—the workfare state. 
POST-FORDIST WORKFARE STATE
As Torfing (1999b) argued, “From the early 1980s onwards, at different times
and speeds, in different fields and in different countries, the Keynesian welfare
state has been subject to several changes which tend to produce a new welfare
regime” (p.373). These changes include the shift, described above, from a Fordist
to a post-Fordist accumulation regime; the growing internationalisation and
globalisation of the world economy; the rise of new technologies; and the crisis
of the Keynesian welfare state itself (Torfing 1999a). These have profoundly
challenged the Keynesian welfare state and facilitated the emergence of a new
state form: The shift to post-Fordism has made states focus on “the supply-side
problem of international competitiveness and to attempt to subordinate welfare
policy to the demands of flexibility” (Jessop 1994b: 27); globalisation has
subjected national economies to increased international competition and this has
undermined the pursuit of Keynesian policies at the national level (Pierson
1994); the rise of new technologies has produced a shift in public funding away
from the traditional manufacturing industries and seen a reorganisation of the
workforce (Jessop 1994b); and the crisis tendencies of the Keynesian welfare
state, such as stagflation and fiscal crisis, have undermined confidence in the
state and acted as a restraint on economic growth. 
In response to these changes, the state has experienced significant structural
alterations over the last two decades and the emerging new post-Fordist workfare
state differs significantly from the previous state form. The post-Fordist workfare
state aids capital accumulation through the promotion of “product, process,
organisational, and market innovation in open economies in order to strengthen
as far as possible the structural competitiveness of the national economy by
intervening on the supply-side” (Jessop 1994b: 24). In terms of social regulation,
the post-Fordist state “can be described as a workfare regime in so far as it
subordinates social policy to the demands of greater labour market flexibility and
lower social expenditure” (Torfing 1999a: 373). Furthermore, the state has
become de-centralised, or in Jessop’s words ‘hollowed-out’, as it has seen its
power shifted on the one hand to supra-national and regional forms of
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governance; and on the other hand to private agencies (Jessop 1994b; Torfing
1999a). The post-Fordist workfare state thus “marks a clear break with the
Fordist welfare state as domestic full employment is de-prioritised in favour of
international competitiveness and redistributive welfare rights take second place
to a productivist re-ordering of social policy” (Jessop 1994: 24). This re-
orientation of the state has made it more suited to the accumulation needs of the
emerging post-Fordist economy. It has also helped resolve the crisis of the
Fordist welfare state. 
THREE WORLDS OF WORKFARE CAPITALISM
The description of the post-Fordist workfare state outlined above is very
generalised. In reality, as with Fordist welfare states, there are variations between
states: Esping-Andersen asserts that, while “all advanced Western welfare states
have experienced a degree of socio-economic transformation for which they
were ill-prepared” there are nonetheless “substantial differences in nations’
policy responses to these changes” (Esping-Andersen 1996: 81-82). Therefore,
just as there were three types of welfare state under Fordism (‘three worlds of
welfare capitalism’) there are three variants of the post-Fordist workfare state:
neo-liberal, neo-corporatist, and neo-statist (Esping-Andersen 1999; Jessop
1991) (see Table 2).
The neo-liberal post-Fordist workfare state “emphasises the
recommodification of labour power, the privatisation of state enterprise and
welfare services and the deregulation of the private sector” (Jessop 1991: 95).
This has resulted in a number of changes to the state structure, intended to shift
the balance of power in the labour market towards capital. For example,
corporatist institutions have been dismantled, trade unions’ capacity for strike
action has been reduced, expectations about rising wage levels have been curbed,
and the disciplinary force of social security has been heightened. Welfare
services are transformed into a means of subsidising low paid employment, the
social wage is reduced and benefits are increasingly minimised and means-
tested. Furthermore, a mixed welfare economy becomes the norm in which the
private and charitable sectors assume an increased role in the everyday delivery
of welfare provision (Jessop 1991). 
The neo-corporatist workfare state is characterised by its reliance on
corporatist structures to introduce the flexibility required to complement the
post-Fordist accumulation regime. Economic and social policy is thus “left
neither to the market nor the state: instead their governance is delegated to
various intermediary organisations” (Jessop 1991: 97). However, traditional
corporatist arrangements become more selective as certain “sunset” industries
and peripheral sets of workers are excluded in favour of giving more influence
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to new “sunrise” industries and core workers. Economic policy is increasingly
geared to the micro-economic level. Similarly, the state steps back as key welfare
services, such as health or pensions, become increasingly self-regulated and
welfare becomes more pluralistic.
The neo-statist response “relies on a state guided approach to societal
reorganisation through interventions seeking to regulate the market” (Torfing
1999a: 8). Flexibility is provided through an active labour market policy, which
emphasises training, skills and mobility. Welfare provision will also become
more mixed but the new providers are more likely to be from the charitable and
voluntary sectors than private capital. However, the neo-statist response contrasts
most with the other two because it’s restructuring “would involve further
decommodification to compensate for the market, an active structural policy to
improve market forces and regulation to limit the operation of market forces”
(Jessop 1991: 98).
Despite this tendency towards different types of post-Fordist workfare states,
the underlying emphasis of all three is flexibility. “Priority must be given to
promoting flexibility: the supply-side must take precedence over the demand
side to keep social expenditure (including the social wage) under control”
(Jessop 1991: 99). Furthermore, it must be noted, that post-Fordism itself favours
certain responses over others. For example, Jessop (1991) argues “post-Fordism
seems to point towards an integrated liberal welfare state…this still co-ordinates
flexible supply-side policies and social security policy but would do so in the
interests of capital rather than labour” (p.85). 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HEALTH
The economic and social relationships enshrined within welfare state (and more
recently workfare state) capitalism are important determinants of individual and
population health.  As outlined above, different types of Fordist welfare state
developed and mediated the extent, and impact, of socio-economic position on
health to varying degrees via their different levels of welfare provision.
Similarly, the emergence of post-Fordism has been shaped by the existing form
of welfare state capitalism, with once more varying levels of state protection
from the market. 
WELFARE STATE REGIMES AND HEALTH
Given the characteristics of the “three worlds of welfare/workfare capitalism,” it
would be expected that population health would be best in the more
decommodifying Social Democratic/Statist welfare states of the Scandinavian
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countries and worst in the Liberal welfare states of the Anglo-Saxon countries.
This is the general pattern found by epidemiological studies that have used
welfare state regime typologies to analyse cross-national differences in
population health (Chung and Muntaner 2007; Coburn 2004; Navarro et al. 2003;
Navarro et al. 2006; Eikemo et al. 2008). For example, studies consistently show
that infant mortality rates (IMR) vary significantly by welfare regime type
(Bambra 2006; Chung and Muntaner 2007; Coburn 2004; Navarro et al. 2006),
with rates lowest in the Scandinavian countries and higher in the Liberal regime.
In a longitudinal cross-national study of income inequalities and welfare
provision between countries, Coburn (2004) concluded that countries that were
the least neo-liberal in their economic and social policy orientation (i.e. the
Scandinavian welfare states) had lower Infant Mortality Rates (IMR) and less
mortality at younger ages. This study also suggested that welfare state regime
might be the link between GDP/capita and mortality. 
Similarly, Bambra (2006) found significant differences in IMR between
Esping-Andersen’s three worlds of welfare: weighted IMR for the Liberal
(Anglo-Saxon), Conservative (Bismarckian) and Social Democratic
(Scandinavian) regimes were 6.7, 4.5 and 4.0 respectively. This study also found
a moderate correlation between decommodification levels (1998 data) and IMR
(r=-0.585, p=0.018). In another recent study of IMR, Navarro et al. (2006)
examined differences between four different welfare state regimes (grouped in
terms of political traditions). They found that countries that have had long
periods of government by redistributive political parties (most notably the
Scandinavian countries) have experienced lower IMR and, to a lesser extent,
increased life expectancy at birth. These findings were reinforced by Chung and
Muntaneer’s (2007) multilevel longitudinal analysis of welfare state regimes.
They found around 20 percent of the difference in infant mortality rate among
countries, and 10 percent for low birth weight, could be explained by the type of
welfare state. Social Democratic (Scandinavian) countries had significantly
lower IMR and low birth weight rates, compared to all other welfare state
regimes (when the other three regimes in the analysis were combined). 
Another multi-level study, this time of self-reported health, by Eikemo et al.
(2008) also found that the Scandinavian welfare regimes fared better with lower
rates of poor self-reported health. They also found, after controlling for
individual (socio-economic status, demographics) and regional characteristics,
around 50% of cross-national differences in self-reported health were due to type
of welfare state regime. 
Explanations for the better performance of the Social Democractic/Statist/
Scandinavian welfare state regime in terms of both mortality, and now morbidity,
have varied. For example, Coburn (2004) and Bambra (2006) both suggested that
the key characteristics of the Scandinavian welfare state package (universalism,
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generous replacement rates, extensive welfare services) result in narrower
income inequalities and higher levels of decommodification, both of which are
associated with better population health. Coburn (2004), along with Navarro et
al. (2003; 2006), highlighted the importance of the accumulative positive effect
on income inequalities of governance by pro-redistribution political parties in the
Scandinavian countries. Other commentators (e.g. Bambra et al. 2007;
Stanistreet et al. 2005) have suggested that increased gender equality within the
Scandinavian welfare states may be another incremental factor behind their
better health outcomes. Furthermore, proponents of the social capital approach
have highlighted the high levels of social cohesion and integration within
Scandinavian societies (e.g. Putnam 2000), something that has also been
associated with better population health (e.g. Kawachi et al. 1997). 
However, all these explanations try to pinpoint one or other aspect of the
regime as the cause of the relatively better health in these societies. In contrast,
the theoretical explanations for the development of different welfare state forms
outlined in this paper suggest that it is not one particular facet of the
Scandinavian welfare model that leads to better health outcomes, but the entire
approach to accumulation, legitimation and reproduction taken by this particular
type of welfare state/workfare capitalism. The relative reduction in material and
social inequality in this form of capitalism is a result of the interaction and
combination of a variety of policies (e.g. universal access to welfare services,
higher replacement rates, higher levels of employment amongst both men and
women) over a sustained period of time (Chung and Muntaner 2007; Navarro et
al. 2006).
BEYOND THE THREE WORLDS
This paper has focused extensively on outlining theories of the welfare state
which consider it as a form of capitalism and in doing so it has focused to a large
extent on Esping-Andersen’s (1990) three-fold typology of welfare state regimes
and Jessop’s three-fold typology of workfare regimes (Jessop 1991; 1994a;
1994b). This is rather limiting and does not encapsulate the entire welfare state
regimes literature. Esping-Andersen’s typology has been subject to extensive
criticism in the comparative social policy literature (for an overview see Bambra
2007) and the limitations for public health research have been acknowledged. It
is indeed useful and important for researchers to think beyond Esping-Andersen
when examining the various forms of welfare state capitalism. However, Esping-
Andersen’s typology is a good starting point when outlining a complex
theoretical literature and its relationship to health to a new audience. It is for
future work to fuse the debate about different welfare state regime typologies
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with that of the development of the welfare state as a form of capitalism and its
relationship to population health.  
CONCLUSION
In this paper I have utilised political economy theories to establish that welfare
is a form of capitalism, and one that is restructured in line with the changing
needs of capital accumulation, most notably in response to the shift from a
Fordist to a post-Fordist economy. However, what the political economy school
has also shown is that while the welfare state is a type of capitalism, it has
various existing forms (regimes) and these have had different impacts on social
inequalities and therefore on health—both morbidity and mortality. Previous
epidemiological studies of welfare state regimes and health have not considered
the broader economic and social underpinnings of the welfare state capitalism
and have not explored the ways in which different welfare state regimes, and
their health consequences, have developed. 
The other item of note for public health research that can be taken from this
overview of the political economy of the welfare state is that welfare states, and
their social and economic relationships, cannot be regarded as static. Welfare
states were extensively restructured in response to the crisis of welfare capitalism
and the shift to post-Fordism and although it is suggested that there is a certain
amount of path dependency in the emergence of workfare states (Pierson 1994),
it is unclear whether there will be an increased international convergence in
social and welfare policy in the future. If this were the case then the differences
in health between welfare state regimes may not continue to the same extent.
Certainly, the current global economic crisis may act as a further catalyst in terms
of the continued restructuring of the worlds of welfare. 
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